Introduction repeated interaction? The story, even at this simplified abstract level, is much richer than you might expect. At a more concrete level, there is a vast and growing scientific literature on signaling in and between cells, neurology, animal signaling, and human signaling, that we cannot hope to address here. But at our abstract, game theoretic level, there is one basic point that is clear. Democritus was right.
Is this the end of our story? No, it is the beginning. Signaling systems grow. That means that signaling games themselves evolve. They are not fixed, closed interaction structures but rather open structures capable of change. We need to study mechanisms But, contrary to some claims, neither syntax nor complex signals are the exclusive preserve of humans. It is best then, not to think of these not as the results of some evolutionary miracle, but rather as the natural product of some gradual process.
Signaling transmits information, but it does far more than this. To see this we need to move further than the simple signaling games with one sender and one receiver.
Signals operate in networks of senders and receivers at all levels of life. Information is transmitted, but it is also processed in various ways. Among other things, that is how we think --just signals running around a very complicated signaling network. Very simple signaling systems should be able to learn to implement very simple information processing tasks by very simple means, and indeed they can.
Signaling networks also give a richer view of a dual aspect of signals. Signals inform action, and signaling networks co-ordinate action. Signaling is a key ingredient in the evolution of teamwork. You can think of the flow of information in a corporation, or a government, or a publisher. But you can also think of teamwork in animals, in cooperative hunting, cooperative breeding, cooperative defense against predators, and cooperative construction of living spaces. These kinds of teamwork are found not only in mammals, birds and the insect societies, but also more recently in micro-organisms.
Teamwork is found in bacteria (myxococcus), amoeboids (cellular slime molds), and algae (volvox). These organisms are models of the transition from unicellular organisms to multicellularity. And the internal workings of multicellular organisms are themselves marvels of teamwork. The coordination of the parts in each of these cases is effected by signals. Of course, in any complex organization, information transmission and processing and coordination of action may not be entirely separate. Rather, they might be thought of as different aspects of the flow of information.
Signaling may evolve for various purposes in networks with different structures.
We look at only simple structures that can be thought of as building blocks for larger, more complex networks. But even at the level of such simple network structures, we have to think of the network topology itself evolving. The last chapter of this book gives a little introduction to this field, and introduces novel low-rationality payoff-based dynamics that learns to network just as well as higher-rationality best-response dynamics.
What is the relation of signaling theory to philosophy? It is epistemology, because it deals with selection, transmission, and processing of information. It is philosophy of (proto)-language. It addresses cooperation and collective action -issues that usually reside in social and political philosophy. It does not quite fit into any of these categories, and gives each a somewhat novel slant. That's good, because the theory of signaling is full of fascinating unexplored questions. 1 Grice is pointing to a real distinction, but in my view it is the distinction between conventional and non-conventional meaning. Conventional meaning is a variety of natural meaning. Natural dynamic processes -evolution and learning -create conventions.
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SIGNALS
"Two savages, who had never been taught to speak, but had been brought up remote from the societies of men, would naturally begin to form that language by which they would endeavor to make their mutual wants intelligible to each other …"
Adam Smith

Considerations Concerning the First Formation of Languages
What is the origin of signaling systems? Adam Smith suggests that there is nothing mysterious about it. Two perfectly ordinary people who did not have a signaling system would naturally invent one. In the first century BC, Vitruvius says much the same thing:
"In that time of men when utterance of a sound was purely individual, from daily habits they fixed on articulate words just as they happened to come; then, from indicating by name things in common use, the result was in this chance way they began to talk, and thus originated conversation with one another." I would like to indicate how we can bring contemporary theoretical tools to bear on these questions.
Sender-Receiver
In 1969 David Lewis framed the problem in a clean and simple way by introducing Sender-Receiver games. 6 There are two players, the sender and the receiver.
Nature chooses a state at random and the sender observes the state chosen. The sender then sends a signal to the receiver, who cannot observe the state directly but does observe the signal. The receiver then chooses an act, the outcome of which affects them both, with the payoff depending on the state. Both have pure common interest -they get the same payoff -and there is exactly one "correct" act for each state. In the correct act-state combination they both get positive payoff; otherwise payoff is zero. The simplest case is one where there are the same number of states, acts and signals. This is where we will begin.
Signals are not endowed with any intrinsic meaning. If they are to acquire meaning, the players must somehow find their way to information transmission. Lewis confines his analysis to equilibria of the game, although more generally we would want to investigate information transmission out of equilibrium as well. When transmission is perfect, so that the act always matches the state and the payoff is optimal, Lewis calls the equilibrium a signaling system. It is a virtue of Lewis's formulation that we do not have to endow the sender and receiver with a pre-existing mental language in order to define a signaling system.
That is not to say that mental language is precluded. The state that the sender observes might be "What I want to communicate" and the receiver's act might be concluding "Oh, she intended to communicate that." Accounts framed in terms of mental language 7 , or ideas or intentions can fit perfectly well within sender-receiver games. But the framework also accommodates signaling where no plausible account of mental life is available.
If we start with a pair of sender and receiver strategies, and switch the messages around the same way in both, we get the same payoffs. In particular, permutation of messages takes one signaling-system equilibrium into another. This fundamental symmetry is what makes Lewis signaling games a model in which the meaning of signals is purely conventional. 8 It also raises in stark form a question that bothered some philosophers from ancient times onward. There seems to be no sufficient reason why one signaling system rather than another should evolve. Of course, there may be many signaling systems in nature which got an initial boost from some sort of natural salience.
But it is worth considering, with Lewis, the worst case scenario in which natural salience is absent and signaling systems are purely conventional.
Information in Signals
Signals carry information. 9 The natural way to measure the information in a signal is to measure the extent that the use of that particular signal changes The word is the shadow of the act. Perfect information about the state is transmitted perfectly if the recei would if he had direct knowledge of the state. As Dem A general treatment of information in signaling requires a lot more tha informational quantity and informational content of signals. The notion of informational content will be new, and will allow a resolution of some philosophical puzzles.
Evolution
As a simple explicit model of evolution, we start with the replicator dynamics.
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It has interpretations both for genetic evolution and for cultural evolution. The population is large, and either differential reproduction or differential imitation lead the population proportion of strategy A, p(A), to change as:
where U(A) is the average payoff to strategy A and U is the average payoff in the population. We see in these simple cases how a perfectly symmetric model can be expected to yield an asymmetric outcome. In our two examples, the principle of sufficient reason is defeated by symmetry breaking in the evolutionary dynamics. The population moves to a signaling system as if -one might say -guided by an unseen hand.
Learning Strategies
As a simple explicit model of unsophisticated learning, we start with reinforcement according to Richard Herrnstein's matching law -the probability of choosing an action is proportional to its accumulated rewards. 14 We start with some initial weights, perhaps equal, assigned to each action. An act is chosen with probability proportional to its weight. The payoff gained is added to the weight for the act that was chosen, and the process repeats. As the weights build up, the process slows down in accordance with what psychologists call the law of practice.
Consider repeated interactions between two individuals, one sender and one receiver, who learn strategies by this kind of reinforcement. This set-up resembles the two-population evolutionary model, except that the process is not deterministic, but chancy. For a nice tractable example consider the 2-state, 2-signal, 2-act signaling game of the last section. Computer simulations show agents always learning to signal, and learning is reasonably fast.
Learning Actions
We helped the emergence of signaling in the foregoing model by letting reinforcement work on complete strategies in the signaling game -on functions from input to output. Essentially, the modeler has done some of the work for the learners. I take this as contrary to the spirit of Democritus, according to which the learners should not have to conceive of the problem strategically. Let us reconceptualize the problem by having reinforcement work on single actions and see if we still get the same result.
To implement this for the simplest Lewis signaling game, the sender has separate reinforcements for each state. You can think of it as an urn for state 1, with red balls for signal 1 and black balls for signal 2; and another such urn for state 2. The receiver also has two urns, one for each signal received, and each containing balls for the two acts.
Nature flips a fair coin to choose the state. The sender observes the state and draws a ball from the corresponding urn to choose a signal. The receiver observes the signal and draws a ball from the corresponding urn to choose an act. The act is either successful, in being the act that pays off in that state, or not. Reinforcement for a successful act is like adding a ball of the color drawn to the sender and receiver urn just sampled. The individuals are being reinforced for "what to do on this sort of occasion". We can then ask what happens when these occasions fit together to form a signaling game.
This model appears to be more challenging than the one in the previous section.
There are now four interacting reinforcement processes instead of two. Equilibria where the sender ignores the state and the receiver ignores the signal are no longer ruled out by appeal to the agents' intelligence and good intentions. Nevertheless, there is now an analytic proof 15 that reinforcement learning converges to a signaling system with probability one. The robustness of this result over a range of learning rules is discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.
States, Acts and Signals
In the simplest Lewis signaling games, the number of states, acts and signals are assumed to be the same. If we have 3 states, 3 acts and only 2 signals, there is an information bottleneck.
The best that the players could do is to get it right 2/3 of the time. This could be managed in various ways. The sender might use signals deterministically to partition the statesfor example, send signal 1 in state 1 and signal 2 otherwise. An optimal receiver's strategy in reply would be to do act 1 when receiving signal 1, and to randomize between acts 2 and 3 with any probability. This identifies a whole line of equilibria, corresponding to the randomizing probability. Alternatively, the receiver could be deterministic -for example, doing act 1 for signal 1 and act 2 for signal 2. If so, an optimal senders strategy to pair with this would always do sending signal 1 in state 1 and signal 2 in state 2, but randomizing in state 3. This identifies another line of efficient equilibria. 16 There are, of course, also lots of inefficient equilibria. Simulations always deliver efficient equilibria.
They are always of the first kind, not the second. That is to say the signaling system always partitions the states. Learning is still fast.
If we have 3 states, but only 2 signals and 2 acts, we can have act 1 right for state 1, and act 2 right for state 3, and then vary the payoffs for state 2: 
Signaling Networks
Signaling is not restricted to the simple 1-sender, 1-receiver case discussed so far.
Alarm calls usually involve one sender and many receivers, perhaps with some of the A sender may distribute information to several receivers.
•←•→• Signalers may form chains, where information is passed along.
•→•→•
In one scenario, the first individual observes the state and signals the state, and the second observes the signal and signals the third, which must perform the right act to ensure a common payoff. There is no requirement that the second individual sends the same signal that she receives. She might function as a translator from one signaling system to another.
When we extend the basic Lewis game to each of these networks, computer simulations show reinforcement learning converging to signaling systems -although a full mathematical analysis of these cases remains to be done. It is remarkable that such an unsophisticated form of learning can arrive at optimal solutions to these various problems. Simple signaling networks are discussed as a locus of information processing in Chapter 10 and as a component of teamwork in Chapter 13.
These networks are the simplest examples of large classes on phenomena of general interest. They also can be thought of as modules, which appear as constituents of more complex and interesting networks that process and transmit information. It is possible for modules to be learned in simple signaling interactions, and then assembled into complex networks by either reinforcement or some more sophisticated form of learning. The analogous process operates in evolution. The dynamics of formation of a simple signaling network is discussed in Chapter 14.
Conclusion
How do these results generalize? This is not so much as single question as an invitation to explore an emerging field. Even the simplest extensions of the models I have shown here are full of surprising and interesting phenomena. We have seen the importance of focusing on adaptive dynamics. The dynamics can be varied. On the evolutionary side, we can add mutation to differential reproduction. In addition, we might move from the large population, deterministic model of the replicator dynamics to a small population stochastic model. The mathematical structure of one natural stochastic model of differential reproduction is remarkably similar to our model of reinforcement learning. 19 On the learning side, we should also consider more sophisticated types of learning. From considering evolution in a fixed signaling game we might move to evolution of the game structure itself. We should explore both signaling on various kinds of networks, but also the dynamics of formation of signaling networks. The rest of this book is an introduction to these topics.
We started with a fundamental question. Suppose we start without pre-existing meaning. Is it possible that, under favorable conditions, unsophisticated learning dynamics can spontaneously generate meaningful signaling? The answer is affirmative.
The parallel question for evolution turns out to be not so different, and is answered in the same way. The adaptive dynamics achieves meaning by breaking symmetry. Democritus was right. It remains to explore all the ways in which he was right. 1 Another echo is to be found in Diodorus of Sicily:
"The sounds they made had no sense and were confused; but gradually they articulated their expressions, and by establishing symbols among themselves for every sort of object they came to express themselves on all matters in a way intelligible to one another. Such groups came into existence throughout the inhabited world, and not all men had the same language, since each group organized their expressions as chance had it." and:
"Democritus who said that names are conventional formulated this principle in four dialectical proofs…. Therefore names are arbitrary, not natural." (6, 1) Translation from Duvick 2007.
